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Category: Security

Rotating Encryption Keys When Using Always Encrypted

Ed Leighton-Dick explains how to rotate your encryption keys when using Always Encrypted in SQL Server:

In my last post, I talked about the process of rotating your encryption keys. It’s just one of those routine maintenance tasks that need to be done from time to time in order to keep your encryption strong for the long haul. One type of rotation I didn’t address in that post was rotation for Always Encrypted, SQL Server’s newest form of encryption.

If you recall, Always Encrypted has two associated keys: a Column Master Key and a Column Encryption Key. The Column Encryption Key (CEK) is a symmetric key, stored in SQL Server. Like other symmetric keys, the CEK is not changed during a rotation. The Column Master Key (CMK), on the other hand, is a certificate, similar to the certificates we’ve used for transparent data encryption and for in-column encryption, and it therefore needs to be rotated regularly. The biggest difference is that the CMK is stored outside of SQL Server, in the Windows certificate store by default, so DBAs may need assistance from their Windows administrators or security administrators.

Read on to see what you need to do.

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Using Have I Been Pwned In R

Maelle Salmon shows us how to use the HIBPwned library in R:

The alternative title of this blog post is HIBPwned version 0.1.7 has been released! W00t!. Steph’s HIBPwned package utilises the HaveIBeenPwned.com API to check whether email addresses and/or user names have been present in any publicly disclosed data breach. In other words, this package potentially delivers bad news, but useful bad news!

This release is mainly a maintenance release, with some cool code changes invisible to you, the user, but not only that: you can now get account_breaches for several accounts in a data.frame instead of a list, and you’ll be glad to know that results are cached inside an active R session. You can read about more functionalities of the package in the function reference.

Wouldn’t it be a pity, though, to echo the release notes without a nifty use case? Another blog post will give more details about the technical aspects of the release, but here, let’s make you curious! How many CRAN package maintainers have been pwned?

Read on to find out that answer.

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Limitations Of Object-Level Security In Tabular Models

Teo Lachev gives us the skinny on object-level security in an Analysis Services Tabular model:

Object-level security (OLS) is a frequently requested security feature when implementing semantic models. For example, a current project disallows some sales persons to see sensitive measures, such as Margin and Profit. In Multidimensional, modelers could use cell security to meet such requirements with the risk of compromising performance. Starting with SQL Server 2017 (compatibility level 1200), Tabular supports object-level security to disallow access to entire tables or specific columns without a performance penalty. As it stands, OLS has the following limitations (for a full list, review the documentation):

Click through for the list of limitations.

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Synchronizing User Logins Across SQL Server Instances

Hamish Watson shows how easy it is to synchronize SQL authenticated logins using dbatools:

When building new servers the most important thing after restoring and securing the database is syncing up the users. This is especially important for Availability Groups as SQL Authenticated users required the SIDS to be the same.

In the past I had some very long winded code that would do the sync – it was a mixture of TSQL and PowerShell. It worked but you know – it was cumbersome.

Read on to see how life gets easier with dbatools.

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SQL Server And STIGs

Mohammad Darab has a quick summary of the Department of Defense’s STIG overview for SQL Server 2016:

To make it easier for people in charge of “STIG’ing” their SQL Server 2016 environment, this blog is aimed to go over the newest MS SQL Server 2016 STIG Overview document (Version 1, Release 1) that was released on 09 March 2018. If you want to read through the whole document you can download it here. Otherwise, below is my summation of the relevant sections.

This overview document was developed by both Microsoft and DISA for the Department of Defense.

The entire overview document is 9 pages (including title page, etc.)

Click through for Mohammad’s summary.  Also check out Chris Bell’s sp_woxcompliant.

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Retrieving Server And Database Permissions

Kenneth Fisher wants you to know about your SQL Server’s permission setup:

Our host for T-SQL Tuesday this month is Jens Vestergaard (b/t) and he has asked about our favorite SSMS tool. My initial thought was to talk about using solutions in SSMSbut I’d already written about that. My next thought was to write about sp_DBPermissions and sp_SrvPermissionswhich of course I’ve written about several times. No big surprise, I wrote them after all.

So what tool am I going to write about? Well, sp_DBPermissions and sp_SrvPermissions of course. I mean I did write them after all, and Jens did say we could brag about something we wrote :).

Read on for more information about these useful tools.

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Collecting Login Details With dbatools

Chrissy LeMaire shows us several ways to track who has connected to your SQL Server instance:

Using the default trace is pretty lightweight and backwards compatible. While I generally try to avoid traces, I like this method because it doesn’t require remote access, it works on older SQL instances, it’s accurate and reading from the trace isn’t as CPU-intensive as it would be with an Extended Event.

Click through for details on this as well as three other methods, along with the dbatools glue to make it work.

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Encrypt Those Database Backups

David Fowler shows how easy it is to encrypt database backups in SQL Server:

We all go to great lengths to make sure that our databases are secure (or at least I really hope that we do), we make sure that only authorised users have access and then only to the databases and levels that they need.  We’re careful that all our passwords conform to crazy complexity rules.  We’re a pretty security minded lot aren’t we?

But what about our backups?  Most of the time they’re just sitting on, either a local disk on the server itself or some share somewhere.  Wherever they are, what happens if someone manages to get hold of our backup files?  They can easily just restore them onto a server where they have permissions and voila, all our super secret data is now theirs.

They could even just open the files with a hex editor read the data, it’s really not a difficult thing to do.

By default, SQL Server makes absolutely no effort to encrypt or in any way protect our backups.  That’s pretty bad in my mind.

If you’re on Standard Edition, this became available in 2014.  For Enterprise Edition, it was available earlier.  At this point, I don’t think there are good reasons for not encrypting backups on production systems.

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Second-Order SQL Injection Attacks

Bert Wagner explains what he calls second-order SQL injection attacks:

SQL injection attacks that delay execution until a secondary query are known as “second order”.

This means a malicious user can inject a query fragment into a query (that’s not necessarily vulnerable to injection), and then have that injected SQL execute in a second query that is vulnerable to SQL injection.

Let’s look at an example.

Another way of thinking about this is a persisted SQL injection attack, akin to reflected versus persisted cross-site scripting attacks.  The fix is, don’t trust unsanitized user input.  Just because you put a user’s data into your database doesn’t mean that someone sanitized it, so treat that stuff as unsafe unless you know otherwise.

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The Risk Of Opening Your SQL Server To The Internet

Max Vernon explains why it’s a bad idea to let your SQL Server be Internet-accessible:

First, it might be helpful to understand why someone might want to connect to their SQL Server via the Internet. Consider any of the following likely scenarios:

  • There is a client application or website hosted in a different data-center that needs access to the data stored in the SQL Server.
  • You need to provide geographical redundancy between several SQL Servers located in different countries that are only connected via the Internet.
  • You’re doing development on a hosted SQL Server and don’t understand the implications of having SQL Server exposed.

The typical way you might expose your SQ Server to the Internet when the server is behind a router or firewall is to open an incoming TCP port at the router or firewall directed at the SQL Server on port 1433. If you do this, you will very quickly start seeing incoming connection attempts from computers on the Internet. These attempts will try to login, typically via the “sa” account, continuously trying passwords.

It’s best to avoid this mess altogether, though if you do need to expose your SQL Server to the Internet, Max has tips on how to mitigate some of that risk.

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